Tribute system between Chinas Ming and Qing Dynasty with Choson Korea

Journal of East Asian Studies 13 (2013),233-257 Comforting Fictions: The Tribute System, the Westphalian Order, and Sino-Korean Relations Kirk W Larsen Observers and practitioners of Sino-Korean relations in both the pre- and post-nineteenth century have utilized powerful “comforting fictions” to describe and justify power asymmetry. In the prenineteenth-century period, the idea of the “tribute system” put a veneer of Confucian benevolence on what a closer examination reveals to have been unequal and coercive relations. Western proponents of the Westphalian system of sovereign equality saw the new norms of international relations as potentially liberating to Korea, a way to free Korea from the Chinese yoke. However, Westphalian equality, too, was a comforting fiction that masked the reality of imperialism-both formal and informal. The Qing empire played a heretofore neglected role in both types of unequal coercive relations between Korea and the outside world. KEYWORDS: Chason Korea (1392-1910), Ming China (1368-1644), Qing China (1644-1910), tribute system, Westphalian system, imperialism IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY, BOTH THE QING EMPIRE (CHINA) and the Chosen kingdom (Korea) exchanged one comforting fiction, the so-called tribute system, for another comforting fiction, the Westphalian system of modem international relations. 1 Some explanation of the term “comforting fiction” is warranted. Tribute system between China’s Ming and Qing Dynasty with Choson Korea

First: “fiction.” It is apparent that many of the actual participants in the tribute system were entirely unaware of the systematic nature of the rules that structured and limited their interactions. Indeed, the “tribute system” is an idea for which there was no indigenous Chinese (or Korean) term in the time period during which the tribute system was thought to have existed (Mancall 1984, 13). And while some practitioners of modem Westphalian-style relations wrote of international law and the “fam233 Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Washington, on 30 Dec 2016 at 03:39:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800003921 234 Comforting Fictions ily of nations,” many were likely only dimly aware at best of the systematic rules that supposedly governed modern international relations. Leaving aside such conceptual complexities, it is also apparent that the actual practice of international relations did not always comport to the supposed rules of such relations, be they systematic or otherwise. This is where “comforting” comes in. In terms of Sino-Korean relations under the “tribute system,” both sides went to great lengths to describe their interactions not as the result of an unequal power relationship but as the natural result of the mutual acceptance of shared Confucian norms. Unlike other relationships that might be explained by Thucydides’s famous axiom that “they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get” (Thucydides 1989, 365), Sino-Korean tributary relations were said to have been based on both China’s and Korea’s acknowledgment of the centrality of China, its emperor, and its civilization. As long as China adhered to its Confucian obligations, the loyalty of its Korean vassal was natural and inevitable, requiring neither coercion nor extensive intervention. “In administering your government, what need is there for you to kill?” Confucius famously queried. “Just desire the good yourself and the common people will be good” (Confucius 1979, 115). And yet despite the ubiquitous declarations of adherence to Confucian ethics-“I use only the Five Classics to rule the realm,” proclaimed the Ming Yongle emperor (Brook 2010, 92)-the actual practice of SinoKorean relations diverged, often significantly, from the Confucian norm.’ Yet both sides appeared more than willing to cling to the comforting fiction that their relations were not merely the result of the coercion that Thucydides’s Athenians assumed was the natural outgrowth of power asymmetry. These oft-repeated comforting fictions have greatly influenced present-day depictions and understandings of East Asian international relations before the nineteenth century. Many contemporary scholars appear to have accepted more or less at face value the notion that the tribute system in general and Sino-Korean relations in particular were predicated on something other than mere power relations. In his “preliminary framework” of the “Chinese world order,” John King Fairbank placed Sino-Korean relations into the category of “Attraction” (rather than “Control”-either “Military” or “Administrative”-or “Manipulation”) based on “Cultural” and “Ideological” elements (Fairbank 1968, 13). Tribute system between China’s Ming and Qing Dynasty with Choson Korea

Following in this vein, Mark Mancall’s (1984, 32-33) declaration that “Korean kings, for instance, accepted investiture in office from the Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Washington, on 30 Dec 2016 at 03:39:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800003921 Kirk W Larsen 235 Chinese emperors and sent them tribute missions regardless of the dynasty’s military might, and they did this almost solely on the basis of Confucian principles, backed up by commercial advantage and the cultural and traditional image, though not necessarily the physical reality, of power” is representative of many similar expressions (Chun 1968, 90; Chung 1995, 8-9; Kang 2010, 55; Shambaugh 2004/5, 95). The presence of some revisionist scholarship that highlights the bluntly coercive and militaristic aspects of Chinese statecraft and foreign policy (di Cosmo 2009; Johnston 1998) has not, apparently, significantly altered this conclusion. In addition, while some have acknowledged considerable diversity in the range of relations included under the umbrella term “tribute system,” the notion that Korea was perhaps the best representation of the tributary ideal remains firmly entrenched in the minds of many (Chun 1968, 90; Clark 1998, 272; de Heer 1993, 240; Gills 1993, 196; Hevia 1995, 50; Kim 1980, 1; Kye 2005, 109). When Westerners appeared in East Asia in significant numbers in the nineteenth century, they found the Chinese and Korean descriptions of their own relations not comforting but confusing and troubling. Backed by unstoppable military might, the West demanded that the rules of international relations be changed from the supposed tradition of ritual-based hierarchy to conform more closely to the Westphalian system of diplomatic and commercial relations conducted between sovereign and equal nation-states. Contemporary observers and subsequent generations of scholars have been convinced that the Qing empire was dedicated to shoring up the tribute system in the face of Western challenges and that many Koreans, aside from a handful of so-called Progressives, clung to the past with equal intensity (Chay 1990, 57; Han 1970; Kim 1993, 584; Kim 1997,40-66; Lee 1984, 274, 378; Lin 1935, 205-206). By doing so, both China and Korea were thought to have held themselves back from the promises of modernity and the liberating potential of Westphalian equality. Ultimately, however, both the Qing empire and Chosen Korea would comply with the new international norms. But the system of modem international relations was no less a comforting fiction than the system it purportedly supplanted. When it came to the Chosen kingdom, the new international order being ushered in was not a Westphalian “family of [equal and sovereign] nations.” Rather, it was a conclave of empires, none of which was terribly interested in asserting or protecting the sovereign and equal status of Korea. Tribute system between China’s Ming and Qing Dynasty with Choson Korea

What follows is a cursory exploration of both comforting fictions. First, an examination of Sino-Korean relations during the Ming (1368- Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Washington, on 30 Dec 2016 at 03:39:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800003921 236 Comforting Fictions 1644) and Qing (1644-1912) eras reveals periods of marked divergence from the tributary ideal and the Confucian ethics that supposedly underpinned it. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the period of the longest continual adherence to tributary norms in the Sino-Korean relationship was the very period during which Chosen Koreans, the self-declared most Confucian people on earth, were convinced that the rulers in China, the Manchu Qing, were most decidedly not civilized, and, therefore, unworthy of respect or veneration. Second, when considering the critical nineteenth-century transition from “tribute” to “modem” relations, the role of the Qing empire deserves reconsideration. The Qing empire played a heretofore underappreciated role in ushering in the new Westernstyle relations to the Chosen kingdom. Moreover, while often described in the rhetoric of tradition, what the Qing empire actually did was as new and unprecedented as what the Western powers did in Korea at the same time. Finally, despite the confident affirmations made by some Westerners of the liberating potential of membership in the “family of nations,” Chosen Korea discovered that such rhetoric was indeed a fiction, one that gave small comfort to a kingdom and people inexorably drawn not into sovereign equality but into the vortex of imperialism. A “Model Tributary”? The centuries of relations between China and Korea defy easy characterization and summary. Nevertheless, many contemporary scholars have concluded that the relations can be summarized either by reference to a small set of recurring practices or to a tribute system, the parameters of which were ostensibly recognized and agreed upon by both China and Korea. In contrast to Westphalian equality, relations between China and Korea were assumed to have been unequal: China was the superior, Korea the inferior. This hierarchy was expressed in the titles used for the rulers of both places: China had an emperor (huangdil hwangche), in theory the only such title in the world. Korea, along with other recognized states (guo/guk), merely had a king (wang). Korea sent tribute missions to China in which Korean envoys offered goods and ritual obeisance to the Chinese emperor. The Chinese, in return, sent occasional missions to Korea, usually to grant investiture (zefeng/ ch ‘aekbong) to Korean kings newly ascendant to the throne. Korea agreed to use the Chinese calendar, particularly in any correspondence with China. Tribute system between China’s Ming and Qing Dynasty with Choson Korea

Aside from these ritual expressions of hierarchy, other modes of interchange-trade, travel, the permanent stationing of representatives in Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Washington, on 30 Dec 2016 at 03:39:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800003921 Kirk W Larsen 237 respective capitals, and the like-were thought to have been sharply limited if not altogether prohibited. Times of emergency, when the Chinese elder brother was obligated to come to the aid of its Korean younger sibling, were thought to be the exception. Distance and noninterference were the rule. In addition to the contrast between traditional hierarchy and modem sovereign equality, other differences between the “tributary” mode of relations and the ideal Westphalian-style relations are apparent. Neither side had a diplomatic presence, or any other kind of abiding presence for that matter, in the other’s capital. And while both sides made occasional references to tradition or “old statutes” tjiudian/kujon) as a resource for understanding and delimiting the relationship (Kojong sil10k 1871 [KJ 8.4.17]),3 it is apparent that these did not function in the same manner as a treaty in Western-style relations. Whether there actually was a tribute system in any meaningful sense of the term is a matter of considerable debate. It is clear that some Chinese descriptions of regional interstate relations assumed a universal acceptance of a Sino-centric hierarchical order predicated on ritual expressions of subservience on the part of the vassal and benevolence on the part of the suzerain. Moreover, China’s far-flung tributaries were at least occasionally viewed as potential allies and resources to be drawn upon, as was the case in the late-sixteenth-century Japanese invasions of Korea, which prompted the Wanli emperor (r. 1572-1620) to repeatedly declare that massive armies recruited from the distant tributaries of the Ming were on their way to help defeat the Japanese (Swope 2009, 125, 150,244).4 Whatever unity the tribute system had as an organizing principle for Chinese foreign relations during the Ming was seriously challenged during the subsequent Qing era (1644-1912). In ruling their far-flung, multiethnic regime, the rulers of the Qing used a variety of approaches and institutions to deal with its various “constituencies” (to use Pamela Crossley’s [1999] term) both within the realm and beyond; many of these were far removed from anything resembling “tribute.” Whether it was negotiating with the Russians on a basis of equality and pragmatism (resulting in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk) or using the Buddhist imagery of the Cakravartin (wheel-turning king) in correspondence with Tibetans, it is apparent that the Qing rulers found the language and concepts of “tribute” to be only one arrow in their well-stocked quiver of foreign relations approaches. Even cases that are often assumed to be within the purview of the tribute system display significant variations. Tribute system between China’s Ming and Qing Dynasty with Choson Korea

The Western powers that Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Washington, on 30 Dec 2016 at 03:39:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800003921 238 Comforting Fictions traded with the Qing empire under the “Canton system,” for example, did not send tribute to the Qing imperial throne (with rare and contested exceptions) and their interactions with the Qing were not managed by the Board of Rites (traditionally assumed to manage all tributary relations) but by the cohong merchants in Canton itself. While “tribute” may not adequately encompass or explain all cases of East Asian international relations, it is widely assumed that it does well explain Korea’s relations with China. As noted previously, declarations of Korea as a “model tributary” of China are legion. An examination of actual relations between Korea and China renders these declarations incomplete if not problematic. Not So Tributary If tributary relations are characterized by a primary if not exclusive focus on ritual expressions of hierarchy buttressed by shared Confucian norms, there are numerous moments in Ming-Choson relations that fit uneasily at best under the rubric of tribute. While too numerous to fully list here, these moments include Chosen irredentist plans to attack the Ming and reclaim territory in Liaodong (T’aejong sillok 1405 [T’aejong 5.6.27]; Ming demands for authors of offending correspondence (and their families) to be sent to China for harsh punishment with some of the offenders’ dying in Chinese prison and others returned to Korea branded with facial tattoos indicating their criminal status (T’aejo sillok 1397 [T’aejo 6.11.30]; T’aejong sillok 1404 [T’aejong 4.3.27]); Ming requirements of tribute silver and gold in amounts so large that Koreans were forced to melt down Buddhist icons to meet them (Clark 1998, 291); even more onerous demands for human tribute-boys to be castrated to serve as eunuchs in the Ming court (Tsai 1995,293) and girls for the imperial harem (T’aejong sillok 1409 [T’aejong 9.11.13]; Clark 1998, 291-292)5; and, repeated (if not always heeded) calls for Korean military support against various enemies of the Ming (Kye 2006a). It was only in 1479 that all of these “abnormal” aspects of Sino-Korean relations ceased and something more closely resembling “normal” tributary relations took the stage for slightly longer than a century. This period of normalcy ended when, in response to the Hideyoshi Invasions (1592-1598), the Ming engaged in unprecedented involvement and interference in Korean affairs. Ming commanders and officials treated the Chosen king and his officials haughtily (more often they ignored them altogether), Ming soldiers ravaged the countryside, and Ming negotiators pointedly ignored Korean claims and interests in Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Washington, on 30 Dec 2016 at 03:39:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800003921 Kirk W Larsen 239 their dealings with the Japanese (Swope 2009, 194-195). At one point, the frustrated and anxious Chosen court probably took some rueful comfort in learning that it was a Japanese negotiator that repudiated his Ming counterpart’s claim that the Korean peninsula was Ming territory (Swope 2009, 132).6 In short, there was much to Ming-Choson relations that far more closely resembles coercion and raw power relations than the comforting notions of mutual cooperation and respect based on shared civilizational norms. One might contend that the cases briefly recounted above are exceptional, epiphenomenal moments that should not distract from the deeper structure and continuity of tributary relations. One wonders, however, how many exceptions must pile up before the underlying rule comes into question. Tribute system between China’s Ming and Qing Dynasty with Choson Korea

As the Ming declined toward its ultimate demise in the first decades of the seventeenth century, it made increasingly desperate demands of its Korean vassal for continued ritual declarations of support as well as direct military aid. Many in the Chosen court were eager to comply, not least because of feelings of gratitude and loyalty stemming from the Ming assistance during the Hideyoshi Invasions. Some justified rebuffing early overtures from the Jurchen leader Nurhaci by “the excuse of the Ming prohibition on direct relations between tributary countries” (Kye 2006b, 160-161, 163). In this they were opposed by King Kwanghae (r. 1608-1623), who advocated a more pragmatic balancing between the declining Ming and the rising Jurchen power on Chosen’s northern border. Kwanghae cited past precedent when the Koryo kingdom had paid tribute to both Song China and the Jurchen Jin Dynasty as a means of securing national survival (Kye 2006b, 8-9).7 Despite Kwanghae’s vehement opposition, the Chosen court heeded the Ming calls for military support and sent a force to join a Ming expedition against the Manchus, which was decimated in the 1619 Battle of Sarhu. 8 After this defeat, Korea suffered two separate Jurchen invasions (1627, 1636). By the time of the second invasion, the Jurchens (who had rechristened themselves as Manchus) had declared a new dynastythe Qing-and had begun an expansion that would ultimately bring about the demise of the Ming. The Manchus engaged in a number of acts that more closely parallel the difficult times of early Ming-Choson relations than they do the ideal tributary relationship. They forced Chosen King Injo to prostrate himself eight times before the Manchu ruler Hong Taiji (r. 1626-1643) and commemorated this ritual submission with the “Three Ferry Fields Stone,” a memorial stele inscribed with “barbarian” Mongol and Manchu scripts (as well as classical Chinese). They took thousands if not Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Washington, on 30 Dec 2016 at 03:39:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800003921 240 Comforting Fictions tens of thousands of prisoners, including two Chosen princes. Many never returned. They made demands for large …


Purchase answer to see full attachment Tribute system between China’s Ming and Qing Dynasty with Choson Korea